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INDIAN LAND TITLES IN MINNESOTA
To the lawyer there are perhaps no more vexatious questions
affecting real estate titles than those incident to Indian dominion,
control and relinquishment. These questions are peculiar, and
while they often determine titles of lands acquired or attempted
to be acquired of both state and national sovereignties, as well as
titles passing between individuals, they are referable to none of
the established rules of real estate law; neither are they discussed
nor analyzed in the standard text books upon public and private
land titles.
Strangely enough, although practically every foot of our
territory has at some time been burdened with Indian rights and
titles, and although back of every fee patent, antedating it in time
and superior to it in validity, there is an Indian treaty or compact;
writers upon Indian subjects have usually limited themselves
either to a discussion of the Red-man's personal life and habits,
or to his political status, dismissing the more important but less
easily understood question of how we acquired our Indian lands
with certain self-righteous- and ethical comments upon the sup-
posedly shabby treatment accorded the natives in the acquisition
of their dominions. Interesting as these questions of domestic
and political economy may be to the student of politics and races,
they have now become almost purely academic in their nature and
of but little practical importance, either to the individual or to
the nation, because the numerical inferiority of the Indian has
become so pronounced that he no longer appreciably affects our
political life and he has so closely affiliated himself with our
domestic life as to be considered one of us as well as with us.
For the most part he dwells among us as a citizen of the United
States and of the State in which he lives; he votes and holds
property, and by the same right as his white brother; he has
changed his tepee for the house, and generally regulates his home
life by the same rules as govern the home life of the white man.
While such questions have passed into the realm of the inter-
esting but relatively unimportant, there still remains the vastly
important one of how the Indians' previous methods of life and
political status have affected land titles acquired from them.
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The Minnesota investor in rural real estate, particularly in the
newer and less populous sections of the state, and the lawyer who
passes upon the titles are actively interested in these Indian land
problems; probably from no other state in the Union, except
Oklahoma, do so many and various legal questions of this nature
reach the federal and state tribunals nisi prius and appellate.
It will doubtless be a source of surprise to such lawyers as will
read this article to learn that there have been on the dockets of
our Minnesota federal and state courts, within the last five years,
approximately fifteen hundred actions having their origin in these
Indian questions, the variety and complexity of which have been
such as to create a specialty.
The history of land titles in the United States and Canada is
substantially the same. The first visitors to American shores
found the land in the occupancy of native tribes who wandered
over its extent unhindered, save by their own inclination, and
the active opposition of other similar nomadic tribes. Their
tenure was by occupancy only; the Indian seems never to have
developed the white man's conception of a fee title or of any
form of ownership whatever severable from possession. The
yearly return of a certain tribe to a particular locality, with a claim
of right thereto, likened by some writers to our titles, discloses
itself on further investigation to have been nothing more abstract
than a re-assertion of a right of occupancy,-the land in the
interim being without a definable status. The claim was unrecog-
nized by other tribes, save as a matter of expediency,-a sort of
comity existing between those nations having a degree of friendli-
ness toward each other.
The European discoverer, with his notion of a fee severable
from possession, seized the opportunity thus presented, and plant-
ing a cross or a standard in the new land, claimed the fee thereof
for his sovereign, salving his conscience the while with the thought
that the Indian not knowing that he ever had a fee, would not
realize that he lost one. Theoretically and juridicially we have
here, then, the basic principle of Indian land titles-a right of
occupancy in the Indian with the fee elsewhere. Eventually this
became a recognized principle of international and national law,
governing the conduct of the European nations among themselves
in their absorption of the North American continent and estab-
lishing the rule of law which has governed legal tribunals from
the day of discovery to the present time. Whether the question
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be presented to the ancient courts of Virginia or the newer ones
of Minnesota, it is stare decisis.
This created a strange situation, for clearly land has no value
apart from occupancy and user; and a naked fee to the entire
stretch from the Atlantic to the Pacific, with an outstanding
eternal and exclusive right of possession thereto elsewhere would
not produce sufficient funds to pay a notary for acknowledging
its conveyance. So there became of necessity attached to this fee
certain incidents of real value, among which were the exclusive
right of the fee owner to acquire of the Indians their right of occu-
pancy, and the further doctrine that such right once abandoned
attaches itself automatically to the fee. Abreast these two prin-
ciples, like gallant soldiers, took up their westward journey, the
red-man giving ground before them until now there remain to
him but a few scattered reservations of all his vast domain-
eloquent testimony to the power of a fee (with incidents).
The principles set forth above have been enunciated by our
courts in innumerable cases, the leading one of which is Johnson,
et al., v. Mclntosh,1 in which the opinion was written by Chief
Justice Marshall. It is to this opinion that courts and attorneys
generally resort for the purpose of ascertaining the fundamental
theory of Indian political status and the underlying principles
governing Indian land titles. Another well considered and well
known case states the rule of law as follows: Indians, while
maintaining their tribal relations are domestic dependent nations
that occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of
their will which must take effect in point of possession when
their right of possession ceases. 2 Other cases elaborating upon
this principle will be found in the foot-note.
3
It was under this rule that the United States at one time held
title to all of the territory now comprised within the limits of
the state of Minnesota-the ultimate fee in the United States with
the right of occupancy, user and possession in the Indians. This
right of occupancy and user is no valueless transitory right, but
1 Johnson v. McIntosh, (1823) 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 543, 5 L. Ed. 681.
2 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, (1831) 5 Pet. (U. S.) 1, 8 L. Ed. 25.
3 Holden v. Joy, (1872) 17 Wall. (U. S.) 211, 21 L. Ed. 523; United
States v. Cook, (1873) 19 Wall. (U. S.) 591, 22 L. Ed. 210; Beecher v.
Wetherby, (1877) 95 U. S. 517, 24 L. Ed. 440; Buttz v. N. P. Ry. Co.,
(1886) 119 U. S. 55 (67), 30 L. Ed. 33, 7 S. C. R. 100; Jones v. Meehan,
(1899) 175 U. S. 1. 44 L. Ed. 49.. 20 S. C. R. 1; Worcester v. Georgia,
(1832) 6 Pet. (U. S.) 515, 8 L. Ed. 483; United States v. Shanks, (1870)
15 Minn. 369 (302).
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has always been accorded in the courts of our country a dignity
and inviolability equal to that of the fee itself; consequently in
determining the validity of a title in Minnesota, challenged at its
source, one must first ascertain when and by what means the
Indians' right to the same was relinquished. A failure to make
this search may, and often has resulted in an opinion that the
title to the land in question was in a certain party in fee, only to
have it appear later that this fee was burdened with an exclusive
right of occupancy either in an Indian tribe or individual.
Relinquishments of these Indian rights are to be found in the
numerous treaties with the tribes formerly occupying this terri-
tory-chiefly with the Sioux or Dakota and the Chippewa or
Ojibway tribes.
The boundary between these two nations having been fixed by
the treaty of August 19, 1825, 4 thereafter the United States pro-
ceeded to acquire the Indian title through the medium of various
treaties and compacts. 5
About the year 1862 the federal government had obtained
relinquishments to all of the Sioux lands within the boundaries
of the state of Minnesota, except a few reservation tracts,
and these were confiscated as a penalty for the Sioux up-rising,
which occurred in that year. The Chippewa lands were acquired
in the same way by treaty, but not so completely, and in the year
1889 steps were taken to obtain all of their remaining reservations
in this state, except two. Congress, having declared in the year
1871 that thereafter no more treaties should be made with Indian
tribes, but that they should be governed by the federal laws
enacted independently of treaty agreements, passed in 1889 what
is commonly known and referred to by lawyers and courts as the
Nelson Act,6 providing for the cession by the Chippewa Indians
of all of their reserved lands in Minnesota, except the White
Earth and Red Lake Reservations, so that in the entire state there
now remain only these two reservations. Agencies are maintained
47 Stat. at L. 272.
5 Sioux Treaties, Sept. 29, 1837, 7 Stat. at L. 538; July 23, 1851, 10
Stat. at L. 949; Aug. 5, 1851, 10 Stat. at L. 954; Chippewa Treaties,
July 29, 1837, 7 Stat. at L. 536; Oct. 4, 1842, 7 Stat. at L. 591; Aug. 2,
1847, 9 Stat. at L. 904; Aug. 21. 1847, 9 Stat. at L. 908; Sept. 30, 1854,
10 Stat. at L. 1109; Feb. 22, 1853, 10 Stat. at L. 1165; Mar. 11, 1863, 12
Stat. at L. 1249; Oct. 2, 1863, 13 Stat. at L. 667; Mar. 7, 1864, 13 Stat.
at L. 693; Mar. 19, 1867, 16 Stat. at L. 719.6 25 Stat. at L. 642.
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at other points, but these are the only two reservations in the
true sense now existent within Minnesota.
In searching out land titles in this state, then, the lawyer may
start with the assumption that the fee was in the United States
by virtue of the principles set forth in Johnson v. Mclntosh7 and
that at some time this fee was burdened with an exclusive right
of occupancy in some Indian tribe.
Other Indian tribes than the Sioux and Chippewas have for
short periodg had a right of occupancy to limited portions of
Minnesota territory, but the bulk of this state was held by the
Sioux and Chippewa tribes and a resort must be had to the
treaties and laws hereinbefore mentioned, to ascertain how, and
under what conditions the right to occupancy passed from the
Indian to the national government. It is in this manner and by
this means that the right of the Indian has been extinguished to
Minnesota and to substantially all the rest of the United Sstates.
Occasionally there finds its way into our courts a suit wherein
the plaintiff claims title to immensely valuable tracts of *land,
generally located in some large city (Chicago being favored in
this regard), by virtue of an ancient compact or agreement with
some historic Indian chief or sachem. The leading case of
Johnson v. McIntosh arose out of an attempt on the part of indi-
viduals claiming through Indian grantors to dispossess others
claiming through the United States, and decided once for all the
invalidity of such grants.
While this is the rule of law which has been applied by the
courts generally when the transaction is between individual
Indians or tribes and other individuals, a different rule obtains
when the grant to an individual is incorporated in a treaty to
which the United States itself is a party; in such a case the
grant is valid.' If the treaty reservation is to an Indian member
of the tribe, party to the treaty, he takes the reserved property in
fee, and unless a restrictive clause is incorporated in the grant,
may alienate the same.10 However, if the reservation is for the
benefit of the tribe itself and not for an individual member thereof
7 (1823) 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 543, 5 L. Ed. 681.
8 Ibid.
9 Mitchell v. United States, (1835) 9 Pet. (U. S.) 711; Crews v. Bur-
cham, (1861) 1 Black (U. S.) 352, 17 L. Ed. 91.
20 Jones v. Meehan, (1899) 175 U. S. 1, 44 L. Ed. 49, 20 S. C. R. 1.
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no fee passes, but the United States holds title in trust for the
use and benefit of the tribe.11
It may be stated as a general rule that lands ceded by Indian
tribes to the federal government, unless the treaty of cession
stipulates otherwise, become public lands within the strict mean-
ing of that term, as used in Congressional statutes dealing with
the disposition of public lands and are subject to the usual home-
stead laws relative thereto. 2 Inasmuch as the general principles
of public land law are incorporated in innumerable court decisions
throughout this country, and in textbooks, nothing need be said in
this article with respect to such lands as have reached the national
government through proper cession; no special difficulty attaches
to such titles. The great majority of suits have their origin in
attempts by individual Indians to dispose of their lands, however
obtained, to individual purchasers.
Until comparatively recent years, generally throughout the
United States and its territories, the Indian tribes held their
lands by tenure of common occupancy with the power of cession
in the chiefs and head-men; neither their domestic or political
economy demanded private property in land and it was only the
federal policy toward them that wrought a change in this respect.
In the year 1887 Congress being of the opinion that the pro-
gress of the redmen towards civilization could best be accelerated
by breaking up the large tracts held in common into individual
and separate parcels, enacted what is called the General Allotment
Act 3 providing for the allotment in severalty of the remaining
reservations throughout the United States in the discretion of
the President. This. Act provided, in substance (so far as the
same is material to this discussion), that there should be allotted
to each individual Indian entitled thereto, eighty acres of land,
such allotment to be evidenced by patents (so-called) :
"which patents shall be of the legal effect and declare that the
United States does and will hold the land thus allotted for the
period of twenty-five years, in trust for the sole use and benefit
of the Indian to whom such allotment shall have been made, or
in case of his decease, of his heirs, according to the laws of the
state or territory where such land is located, and that at the
expiration of such period, the United States will convey the same
11Johnson v. Gearlds, (1914) 234 U.S. 422, 58 L. Ed. 1383, 34 S.
C. R. 794.
12 Selkirk v. Stephens, (1898) 72 Minn. 335, 75 N. W. 386, 40 L. R. A.
759.
1" 24 Stat. at L. 388.
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by patent to said Indian, or his heirs as aforesaid, in fee, dis-
charged of said trust and free of all charge or encumbrance
whatsoever: Provided, That the President of the United States
may in any case in his discretion extend the period, and if any
conveyance shall be made of the lands set apart and allotted as
herein provided, or any contract made touching the same before
the expiration of the time above mentioned, such conveyance or
contract shall be absolutely null and void: Provided, That the
law of descent and partition in force in .the state or territory
where such lands are situate shall apply thereto after patents
therefor have been executed and delivered."
By this same Act those Indians who took allotments under it
were made citizens of the United States and subject to the laws,
both civil and criminal, of the state or territory in which they
resided. By later Act14 this citizenship and subjection to state
laws was withheld until the issuance of fee patents.
Under the General Allotment Acts or acts predicated thereon,
large areas in Minnesota and elsewhere were segregated from
common ownership and allotted in severalty to individual Indians.
What sort of title do such Indians take? They take an equitable
inheritable interest, inalienable, non-taxable and not subject to
judicial sale, lien or attachment in any form.15 The legal title to
the allotted lands remains in the United States which holds the
same in trust for the allottee or his heirs throughout the statutory
period of twenty-five years.
Much of the lands thus allotted is of great value-some as oil
properties, as in the case of the Oklahoma lands; others for
agricultural and timber products, such as the Minnesota lands;
and innumerable attempts have been made to secure them
through purchase either directly from allottees or by judicial
procedure. Such attempts have been invariably frustrated by
prompt action on the part of the United States bringing suit in
its own name to set aside 'such liens and conveyances as violative
of the restrictions imposed by the federal laws. It matters not
whether these restrictions are those imposed by the General Allot-
ment Act or by the terms of patents issued pursuant to some other
restrictive law.1 6
So long then as lands are held by original Indian allottees
under the General Allotment Act, or similar acts, they are inalien-
14 May 8, 1906, 34 Stat. at L. 182.
15 Beam v. United States, (1908) 162 Fed. 260.
16 Heckman v. United States, (1912) 224 U. S. 413, 56 L. Ed. 820, 32
S. C. R. 424.
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able; upon the death of the allottee the heirs may sell, but the
conveyance does not become effective for any purpose until ap-
proved by the secretary of the interior, whereupon the title passes
to the purchaser as though a fee simple patent had issued to the
allottee.1
7
An inspection of the General Allotment Act and an acquaint-
ance with the manner in which these provisions have been exe-
cuted readily discloses the grounds for the multiplicity of suits
which have arisen under it. In the main, the method by which
an Indian obtains an allotment on a Minnesota reservation is for
him to make an application for a certain described tract; this
application along with others will then be held in the office of
the Indian Agent until a sufficient number are on file to warrant
the making of a schedule thereof, to be forwarded to the secretary
of the interior for his approval. A long period of time (in some
instances ten years), may intervene before the application and
the approval by the secretary. What are the rights of the applicant
during this time, and if he dies what are the rights of his heirs?
Are his rights fixed and descendable as in the case of a homestead
entryman, or does he have a mere personal expectancy-a float
which perishes with him? In other words, when does an allot-
ment become effective? Is it upon application or upon the ap-
proval thereof by the secretary or not until the trust patent has
issued? Important as this question is it seems never to have been
presented to the Supreme Court of the United States, nor so far
as the writer knows, to a United States circuit court of appeals.
Two federal trial courts have been called upon to answer this
question upon demurrer, and they appear to have reached di-
rectly opposite conclusions. It was held in one case' s that one
who had gone no further than to apply for an allotment had a
personal expectancy only and that upon his death his heirs took
nothing. In a later case 9 the court was of the opinion that if
selection had been made, an inheritable right was created entitling
the heirs of the applicant to the allotment selected. Under the
circumstances, the question is an open one so far as the courts
are concerned, and a lawyer in giving his opinion must be gov-
erned by his own judgment and the appeal which the reasoning
of the two cases makes to him. Ii is the opinion of the writer
17 Act May 27, 1902, 32 Stat. at L. 245.
18 Sloan v. United States, (1902) 118 Fed. 283.
19 Smith v. Bonifer, (1904) 132 Fed. 889.
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that if a selection has been made an inheritable interest vests and
that the heirs of the applicant will take the same right to have
the allotment completed that the applicant would have had if he
had lived. This does not mean that the right to the allotment be-
comes absolute upon selection; it only means that whatever right
or advantage the original selector gained will descend, and then
if the selection is later approved and a trust patent issued the
allotment becomes complete in the heirs. This is in line with
the case of Smith v. Bonifer.20  In a very recent case United
States v. Chase2 ' decided by the United States Supreme Court on
November 5, 1917, it was held that a patent issued in the name
of an Indian applicant after his death, inures to the benefit of his
heirs under the United States Revised Statutes, Section 2448, and
that if the selection had not at the time of the death of the appli-
cant advanced to a point where the patent could properly issue,
only the United States or the tribe could complain of its improper
issuance. This disposes of the matter under discussion so far as
individual contenders are concerned, but leaves undecided the
point at which it may be said that the patent was properly issued.
Assuming that such an estate has been created as to be de-
scendable a new difficulty presents itself. What tribunal shall
determine the heirs of the deceased allottee? The General Allot-
ment Act provides that the United States shall hold the allotted
lands in trust for the allottee or his heirs, according to the laws
of the state in which the land is situate. At first blush this would
seem to indicate that the state probate courts have jurisdiction,
but a more careful perusal and a consideration of the decided
cases lead to a different conclusion. It will be observed that the
Act does not say that the heirs are to be determined by the courts
of the state, it merely provides that. the United States will hold
the land in trust for the heirs, according to the laws of the state.
This means that those persons who are the heirs under the state
law will become cestuis qui trustent tipon the death of the allottee
and that the United States will hold the lands in trust for them in
the proportions provided by the state laws governing the descent
of real property, but it does not mean that the jurisdiction to
ascertain those persons has been surrendered by federal agencies
to state probate courts.
20 Note 19 supra.
21(1917) 38 S. C. R. 24, U. S. Adv. Ops. 1917, p. 30.
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Succinctly, it may be stated that prior to August 15, 1894, such
jurisdiction was in the secretary of the interior; that by the Act of
August 15, 1894,22 this jurisdiction was transferred to the district
courts of the United States23 where it remained until the Act of
June 25, 1910,24 when it was restored to the secretary of the in-
terior.
25
In this latter case it was held that although the jurisdiction of
a tribunal had attached for the purpose of determining heirs un-
der Indian Allotment Acts, such jurisdiction ceased immediately
upon the passage of a law vesting the same in another tribunal.
Thus, although the jurisdiction of the district court to determine
heirship had already been properly invoked, if during the pend-
ency, either in the district court or in the circuit court of appeals,
Congress should enact a law vesting jurisdiction elsewhere, the
suit would be subject to dismissal on the grounds of lost juris-
diction. For a Minnesota case denying state probate jurisdic-
tion over the estate of an allottee who died while his land was
held in trust by the United States, see Holmes v. Praun.2 1. In an
earlier Minnesota case2 7 it was held that over the estate of a tribal
Indian not a citizen, even though he held title to his lands in fee
simple, the probate court of the state had no authority.
On the White Earth Reservation in Minnesota, where for the
last decade the greatest activity has prevailed, the situation has
been complicated by an Act of Congress, passed June 21, 1906,23
providing as follows:
"That all restrictions as to sale, encumbrance or taxation for
allotments within the White Earth Reservation in the State of
Minnesota, now or hereafter held by adult mixed-blood Indians
are hereby removed and the trust deeds heretofore or hereafter
executed by the Department for such allotments are hereby de-
clared to pass the title in fee simple, or such mixed-bloods upon
application shall be entitled to receive a patent in fee simple for
such allotments; and as to full-bloods, said restrictions shall be
removed when the Secretary of the Interior is satisfied that such
adult full-blood Indians are competent to handle their own af-
fairs, and in such case the Secretary of the Interior shall issue
22 28 Stat. at L. 286.
23 McKay v. Kalyton, (1907) 204 U. S. 458, 51 L. Ed. 566, 27 S. C. R.
346.
24 36 Stat. at L. 855.
25 Hallowell v. Commons, (1916) 239 U. S. 506, 36 S. C. R. 202.
26 Holmes v. Praun, (1915) 130 Minn. 487, 153 N. W. 951.
27United States v. Shanks, (1870) 15 Minn. 369.
28 34 Stat. at L. 325.
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to such Indian allottee a patent in fee simple upon applica-
tion.".
This innocent-looking and apparently clear statute has con-
cealed within it a litigation germ of marvelous strength and
activity, and the machinery of our federal courts has been almost
clogged with the results following its enactment. Congress in its
wisdom had provided that adult mixed-blood Indians might sell
their allotments, but neglected to provide for any roll showing
who were of that class, and also failed to define the term "mixed-
blood." It might seem that no definition of such a term should
be necessary, but a number of years after the passage of the Act,
and after approximately one-half of the Reservation had passed
into the hands of purchasers who had placed their own interpre-
tation on the term, officials of the United States Department of
Justice appeared and instituted suits in equity, praying the can-
cellation of all instruments, affecting about one thousand allot-
ments, on the grounds that the same were violative of the restric-
tive clauses in the trust patents, and stoutly maintaining that when
Congress enacted the law permitting mixed-bloods to sell, it meant
by the term "mixed-blood" only such Indians as had such a quan-
tum of white blood in their veins as would tend to make them
competent to handle their own affairs. This position was main-
tained with such show of reason and authority, that on two occa-
sions it was held by the federal district court that unless it could
be shown that the allottee had at least one-eighth white blood, he
should not be classed as a mixed-blood, and that his lands should
remain under restraint. On appeal the circuit court of appeals
reversed the trial court, holditig that any Indian having an iden-
tifiable quantum of other than Indian blood, no matter how little,
is a mixed-blood under the Act; which holding was confirmed
by the Supreme Court of the Jnited States.29 It is of interest to
know that in its argument before the Supreme Court, the United
States shifted its ground somewhat and maintained that for the
Indian to come under the classification "mixed-blood" .he must
have at least one-half white-blood, and that all those having less
than one-half white blood are full-bloods.
This difficulty having been removed by the Supreme Court,
the White Earth title question resolved itself into the problem
of how to prove the facts required-how to show to a court that
29 United States v. 1st Nat. Bk. of Detroit, Minn., (1914) 234 U.S.
245, 58 L. Ed. 1298, 34 S. C. R. 846.
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an Indian allottee had some white blood. In those instances
where the allottee was a quarter or a half or more white no
serious difficulty would be encountered; it is in the upper regis-
ters, so to speak, in those cases where the presence of white blood
in very small proportions, such as a one-eighth, a one-sixty-fourth,
or a one-one hundred twenty-eighth is sought to be proven that
trouble arises. What sort of testimony is admissible on such an
issue? If the Indian whose blood status is in dispute has but a
one-one hundred twenty-eighth of white blood, then its presence
is not discernible to the eye and this white blood must have had
its origin in some remote white ancestor concerning whom no liv-
ing witness can speak, 'except from hearsay. A living witness
might say that he had heard his grandfather say that his father
or grandfather was a white man, and if this sort of testimony
falls within any exception to the hearsay rule, proof of white
blood in such instances might possibly be made out, if such testi-
mony may be considered to have any probative value. No re-
cent cases along this line are available, but it was early held by the
Supreme Court of the United States in two cases arising on
petitions for freedom by slaves, that race and status may not be
proven by hearsay.30 While it is probable that a modern court
would relax somewhat the strict rule forbidding hearsay testi-
mony so as to admit proof of reputation in the family, it is by no
means certain that it would do so, and if this line of evidence is
to be eliminated there remains only the appearance of the Indian
and direct testimony as to his blood status, and of these the for-
mer in close cases, is utterly unreliable.
Direct testimony will be either by experts or non-experts, and
experience has shown that it is practically impossible so to qual-
ify a non-expert as to make him competent. As a final expedient
in disposing of the many cases involving this question, resort
was had to the science of anthropology, and experts therein have
been called upon to make personal examinations of the Indians
and express opinions as to the blood status. There the matter
rests.
The Act of Congress of June 30, 1913,31 provides for the ap-
pointment of a commission with exclusive and conclusive powers
to determine the age and blood status of White Earth allottees,
30 Mima Queen v. Hepburn, (1813) 7 Cranch (U. S.) 290., 3 L. Ed.
348; Davis v. Wood. (1816) 1 Wheat. (U. S.) 6, 4 L. Ed. 22.
3139 Stat. at L. 77.
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and when its report has been properly approved, these vexatious
questions will be eliminated.
Numerous isolated problems have arisen from the chaos of
Indian laws and treaties, such as the extent of federal control of
Indians' persons and property at the various steps of emanici-
pation; the right of the state to tax Indian lands and the juris-
diction of state courts generally with respect thereto.
By an uninterrupted line of authorities it has been estab-
lished that Indians holding allotments under the General Allot-
ment Act or Acts equivalent thereto are dependent wards of the
nation in whose behalf the federal government may in its own
name institute and maintain legal and equitable actions almost
ad libitum. Recently an attempt was made to continue this
guardianship in the case of those Indians whose land had been
freed of restrictions by the Act of June 21, 1906,32 but the attempt
was a failure.33
The same Act purported to make Indian lands belonging to
certain classes taxable, and the state authorities acting thereunder
proceeded to list and assess them, a process which was halted by
an injunction from the federal district court, sustained by the cir-
cuit court of appeals. 34  The court held that the exemption from
taxation created by the Nelson Act was a property right of which
the Indians could not be divested by Act of Congress.
Among the questions unrelated to the foregoing is that of the
validity of those titles originating in so-called half-breed scrip.
Immense tracts of valuable timber land in the northern section
of our state were located under authority of those scrip certi-
ficates, and some of the largest and proudest fortunes of the
present day, will, upon investigation, disclose an origin due to
adeptness of their founders in collecting this same lowly scrip.
As originally issued these certificates were intended by Congress
to start the mixed-blood Indians on the way to industry and civili-
zation by providing them with agricultural homes within the lim-
its of the lands ceded to the United States by treaties; but this
purpose was soon lost sight of and the Indians, with the acquies-
cence of of the government officials, soon began to treat their
certificates as assignable and those issued under the treaty of
32 Note 28 supra.
33 United States v. Waller, (1917) 243 U. S- 452, 61 L. Ed. 843, 37
S. C. R. 430.
34 United States v. Morrow, (1917) 243 Fed. 854.
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February 22, 1855, have been so held by our Supreme Court."
Certificates issued under the treaty of 1854 were held by the
court to be not assignable,G but in practice, assignments were
taken and the land located in the name of the Indian. An in-
spection of the records sh6ws that these scrip certificates were
located throughout the public land states of the nation; many
valuable mineral lands in California and Colorado having been
acquired in this wdy. Titles based upon them are generally good.
Despite the extent to which these Indian questions have
been litigated, there remain innumerable sources of dispute. As
an instance of the uncertainty which prevails, the following is
a good illustration:
A certain White Earth Indian having an allotment applied to
the secretary of the interior for a fee simple patent under the
Act of June 21, 1906, which, as stated above, provided for the
issuance of such patents to adult mixed-bloods. The secretary
passed upon the application, decided that the applicant was an
adult mixed-blood and issued a fee patent to him. The Indian
then sold the land, the purchaser relying upon the fee patent.
Later the same Indian sold to another party this same land, and
the second purchaser brought suit against the first vendee in the
state district court in an action to determine adverse claims, con-
tending that when the first deed was given the Indian was a minor.
The defendant answered, setting up the fee patent as determina-
tive of the fact that the Indian was an adult, because fee patents
could be issued only to adults, The case went to the Supreme
Court of the United States, where it was held that so far as the
United States was concerned, the Indian was an adult and the
fee patent conclusive, but as between individuals contesting rights
under the patent, the question of age was an open one permit-
ting proof of the Indian's minority. Thus, we have a case of a
person being conclusively an adult for the purpose of taking title.
but a minor when he attempts to dispose of the same.3
No ambitious attempt has been made in this article com-
prehensively to state the law governing the many and varying In-
dian titles in Minnesota; a volume of respectable size would be
required to do that. The basic principles have been touched upon
35 Kipp v. Love, (1915) 128 Minn. 498, 151 N. W. 201.
36 Dole v. Wilson. (1874) 20 Minn. 356.
.7 Dickson v. Luck Land Co., (1917) 242 U.S. 371, 61 L. Ed. 371,
37 S. C. R. 167.
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and enough of the various features discussed to suggest to any
one interested, the pitfalls which may be encountered. Any at-
tempt to make a short review of this character a guide could only
result in a disservice, for it is the experience of those having to
do with these matters in large volunfe that in no other field of the
law are decisions and interpretations in one case of so little value
in another.
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